Controlling the market price of certain raw materials has adverse effects both politically and economically. The rigour of the export quotas introduced under the tin agreement from December 1957 to September 1960 appears to have had a long-term effect on production capacity; When restrictions on the export of tin were eased, production was unable to accelerate with a strong recovery in consumption and, therefore, this product is a classic example of the irreversible supply curve. One possible lesson of Fidel Castro`s Cuban experience is that there is a subtle, unopened form or form of control of economic markets and a degree of political tyranny. Such a philosophy was shared by supporters of the Anti-Corn-Law League in 19th-century England, who built their case on a supposed link between free trade and world peace. Since the end of the Second World War, agreements have been successfully negotiated on wheat, sugar, tin, coffee and olive oil. The 1949 and 1953 International Wheat Agreements (IWA) and the Post-War International Sugar Agreements (ISA) are prototypes of two forms of commodity agreements – the multilateral treaty and the variable export quota. Land prices and sugar caps have been set and, for the most part, imposed by the export regulations authorised by Member States; the sugar agreement also provided that stocks held by exporters were not higher or lower than the percentages indicated by export quotas. A very different instrumentality was used for wheat. Importers agreed to accept certain quantities when the price fell to the minimum level set in the agreement and exporters agreed to disclose certain quantities to Member States when the contract price was set. In terms of prices between the ground and the ceiling, the wheat agreement should be largely ineffective.
The Tin Agreement (ITA) gradually set higher price thresholds for which a buffer storage agency (a) could purchase, (b) buy, c) could not buy or sell without special authorization, d) sold and (e) was required to sell. The agreement also provided for the introduction of export controls after the accumulation of the cushion exceeded the specified amounts. The main sanction of the coffee agreement, negotiated in 1962 at a long conference, was the certificate of origin to be required of importing countries in order to limit their recipe to exporters who choose to “do it alone”. The USTR cites U.S. participation in two trade agreements on raw materials: the International Tropical Woods Agreement and the International Coffee Agreement (ICA). These two agreements form intergovernmental organizations with boards of directors. International commodity agreements (IIs) are essentially multilateral instruments of state control that support the international price of certain primary raw materials, notably through agreements such as export quotas or guaranteed market access. As a result, international commodity agreements must be distinguished from commodity study groups that lack fully operational responsibility; international non-governmental cartels; and the Combined Food Board (1942-1945) or the International Materials Conference (1951-1953), which involved international allocentric machines for a considerable number of primary raw materials in times of war-induced shortage.